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Abstract
In my thesis, I examine the relationship between modern technology and human autonomy
from the philosophical perspective of Martin Heidegger. He argues that the essence of modern
technology is the Gestell. Often translated as ‘enframing,’ the Gestell is a mode of revealing, or
understanding, being, in which all beings are revealed as, or understood as, raw materials. By
revealing all beings as raw materials, we eventually understand ourselves as raw materials. I argue
that this undermines human autonomy, but, unlike Andrew Feenberg, I do not believe this process
is irreversible from Heidegger’s perspective. I articulate the meaning of the Gestell as an historical
claim and how it challenges human autonomy, but may never absolutely eradicate it. Contra
Feenberg’s interpretation, I argue that Heidegger’s ontology, including the Gestell, provides a
crucial ground for understanding how we might salvage autonomy in a culture increasingly
dominated by modern technology. Specifically, by drawing on Heidegger’s conception of
Gelassenheit, I suggest that salvaging human autonomy requires a calm acceptance and opening
up to the challenge of modern technology. This is not, as Feenberg suggests, a passive acceptance
of the eradication of human autonomy. Rather, this is the ontological ground that provides us with
the possibility of salvaging autonomy. By opening us up to the essence of modern technology, we
understand the contingency of the Gestell, its essentially ambiguous nature, and are granted with
the freedom to subordinate its reign to other human values and modes of understanding being.
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Introduction
Martin Heidegger ends his lecture “The Question Concerning Technology” by cryptically
suggesting that the essence of modern technology is inherently ambiguous insofar as it poses the
most extreme danger to humanity’s understanding of itself while simultaneously granting us the
possibility of salvation from this very threat. The following essay is thus an attempt to understand
this cryptic ambiguity. Pursuing an understanding of this ambiguity requires understanding the
meaning of Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell, which he designates as the essence of modern
technology. For this reason, this work is essentially an attempt to understand the meaning of the
Gestell. Of particular importance, I believe, is Andrew Feenberg’s interpretation of Heidegger’s
conception of the Gestell, which I believe is inadequate and fails to account for the above
mentioned ambiguity. He believes that it is not a philosophically adequate understanding of the
essence of modern technology, and argues that it threatens human autonomy without providing
any room for saving ourselves from this threat. I disagree with Feenberg’s interpretation and argue
that Heidegger’s thought accommodates Feenberg’s desire to salvage human autonomy much
more than he suggests. In fact, I argue that Heidegger’s thought is crucial for salvaging human
autonomy in the increasingly technologically permeated modern world.
As a critical theorist, Feenberg argues that the formal rationality that permeates
technological society undermines human autonomy and should therefore be subject to critical
reflection. And as a practical and politically oriented thinker, he attempts to describe a
technological future that subordinates formal rationality to the pursuit of increasing human
autonomy by reimagining the way in which technology is integrated into our social infrastructure.
Heidegger’s claim that the Gestell poses the extreme danger to humanity, Feenberg rightly points
out, may be interpreted as a threat to human autonomy. For this reason, he does not believe
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Heidegger’s philosophy can help us reimagine our relationship to technology in such a way that
human autonomy is increased; on the contrary, he believes Heidegger’s nihilism led him to reject
the very possibility of human autonomy. In this essay, I argue that Feenberg’s interpretation of
Heidegger’s philosophy is inadequate, particularly because he overlooks the essential ambiguity
of the Gestell. Consequently, he fails to imagine how Heidegger’s thought may help us reimagine
our relationship to ourselves and our world and thereby increase our autonomy.
Outline
In the first chapter of this essay, I attempt to place Heidegger’s conception of modern
technology into the context of human autonomy and freedom. I explicate what may be referred to
as the technological liberation thesis and the historical evidence that supports its case. Namely,
this view suggests that humans were able to liberate themselves from the reign of nature by
constructing technology, which is conceptualized as a neutral means to an end. I then critique this
view from a Heideggerian perspective by focusing on how technology itself may eclipse human
autonomy, provided we understand its ontological essence. Next, I provide a much more detailed
understanding of human autonomy by reconstructing it in Heidegger’s ontological language.
Specifically, I focus on the ontological possibility of authentic and inauthentic conceptions of
autonomy that are shaped by a society’s ontological framework and influence the way in which
individual agents relate to themselves. I argue that human autonomy is grounded in our ability to
understand the essential ground of our being. But the Gestell, however, threatens to conceal this
essential ground. Thus, I motivate the claim (which I believe Feenberg endorses) that the Gestell
threatens to absolutely eradicate human autonomy by concealing, once and for all, the essential
ground of our being. By focusing on technological dystopias and more optimistic interpreters of
Heidegger, however, I ultimately call this view into question.
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In the second chapter, I respond to Feenberg’s nihilistic interpretation of the Gestell by
more carefully examining his reasons for thinking that the Gestell threatens to absolutely eradicate
human autonomy. I interpret Feenberg’s criticisms of Heidegger as a rejection of the Gestell’s
adequacy as an historical claim, and its failure to provide any practical solution to technological
reformation. By analyzing his criticisms, I argue that Feenberg has misunderstood the Gestell by
exaggerating its historical implications. To demonstrate, I consider the way in which the Gestell
may be understood as an historical explanation of early twentieth century European culture, which
is obviously the culture within which Heidegger develops his philosophy. From these
considerations, I make two points: first, the Gestell’s role in modern Europe concretely
demonstrates its ambiguity; and second, it also demonstrates the absurdity of the claim that it may
ever absolutely eradicate human autonomy. I conclude by arguing that Feenberg’s interpretation
of Heidegger’s prescribed response to technology as passive acceptance of technology’s reign and
the abandonment of our desire to be autonomous is woefully misconceived. As historical beings,
we have been destined to be challenged by the Gestell, and therefore cannot hide from its
challenge. In this sense, we must accept the Gestell insofar as we must accept our facticity to avoid
bad faith. But particular individuals are actually granted with the opportunity of more deeply
understanding the essence of their own being provided they reflectively question the essence of
technology in attempt to face and understand its danger. Only in such reflective questioning may
humans understand their essence and increase their autonomy. To passively accept the Gestell
would be to fail to reflectively question its role in our lives, and thereby fail to increase our
autonomy. Therefore, I argue in the final section that Feenberg’s project would actually be
enhanced by incorporating Heidegger’s conception of the Gestell. It provides an ontological basis
for understanding how we, as individual agents, may respond to technology’s threat.
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1 The relationship between technology (das Gestell) and autonomy
In this chapter, I articulate Heidegger’s view concerning the relationship between
technology and human autonomy. Heidegger does not actually discuss human autonomy in the
above mentioned lecture, so constructing the relationship between his conception of the essence
of technology and human autonomy will require some interpretive creativity. First, I will describe
what I refer to as the technological liberation thesis. This thesis assumes technology is a neutral
means to an end absolutely controlled by human agents. With technology’s help, humans liberate
themselves from nature’s dominion. From a Heideggerian perspective, however, this account
conceals more than it reveals. Assuming technology is neutral and absolutely controlled by human
agents turns out to be false when we understand the essence of technology, i.e. the Gestell. By
transforming all beings into exploitable material and challenging humans to order, regulate, and
control said material, which Heidegger believes is the ontological source of modern technology’s
rampant integration into human society, human autonomy is subordinated to the self-directing
logic of the Gestell. In contrast to the technological liberation thesis, this suggests that Heidegger
endorses what some have called the autonomous technology thesis. From Feenberg’s perspective,
it for this reason that Heidegger’s account is antithetical to human autonomy. This is because the
autonomous technology thesis is usually understood to imply that technology’s autonomy eclipses
and eradicates human autonomy.
Although I think it is correct to interpret the Gestell as a sort of self-directing force, i.e. an
autonomous force, I believe it is incorrect to interpret it as entailing the absolute eradication of
human autonomy. This interpretation ignores the essential ambiguity of the Gestell by only
focusing on the threat it poses. This threat, Heidegger suggests, is the danger that the Gestell might
conceal the human essence. Moreover, he suggests that it leads to the illusion that we have become
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“lords of the earth” (332). Thus, I argue that the Gestell threatens human autonomy by concealing
the authentic structure of autonomy and replacing it with an inauthentic conception. In
contradistinction to this inauthentic conception of autonomy, I briefly articulate an authentic theory
of autonomy by describing Heidegger’s conception of the essence of human being. Authentic
autonomy, I argue, is both relative and interdependent upon the autonomy of others and the
autonomy of being itself. But this doesn’t address Feenberg’s worry that the Gestell eradicates
human autonomy. If it threatens to conceal the authentic structure of our autonomy by replacing it
with an inauthentic conception, then it is possible that human autonomy may be completely
eradicated if this threat comes to fruition.
In attempt to fully articulate the threat the Gestell poses, I briefly motivate the claim that it
absolutely eradicates human autonomy (only to reject the adequacy of this claim however). I
consider two stories (We and The Machine Stops) that portray societies in which a technical
ordering of society has concealed many important aspects of human nature. Nevertheless, both
novels describe momentary breaks from the technical rationality of the dominant culture in which
particular individuals are reminded of their humanity. I suggest that it is this sort of threat to
autonomy that the Gestell poses. In other words, the Gestell threatens to become the dominant
ontological framework, but it may never eradicate the possibility that humans may experience
momentary breaks from its reign. To support this claim, I consider some of the most prominent
Heideggerians who would reject Feenberg’s interpretation of the Gestell and suggest that we may
overcome the threat posed by technology. Feenberg, on the other hand, does not read Heidegger
so optimistically. He argues that Heidegger’s so called ‘saving power’ is nothing but a passive
acceptance of technology’s reign and the abandonment of human autonomy. A more complete
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explication of Feenberg’s interpretation of Heidegger and a response to his interpretation will be
the subject of the second chapter.
A Heideggerian critique of the technological liberation thesis
For the vast majority of human existence on earth, if we extend our analysis into the depths
of pre-history, humans have been in constant struggle with the forces of nature. The earliest
manifestations of (pseudo?)-science arose from the need for humans to predict their ever changing
world. Predicting seasonal weather patterns proved necessary for humans to engage in agriculture
and thus avoid the ever present threat of death. The desire to understand greater patterns led to
early astronomical reasoning concerning the relationship between stellar patterns and earthly
weather. Such knowledge proved indispensable for early humans as they were able to plan their
actions accordingly. From this perspective, natural patterns determine human social behavior.
Entire cultural traditions arose in response to the ebb and flow of natural patterns. This view of
early social traditions is, however, incomplete. It stresses our negative relation to nature, namely
that our lives are determined by nature. But there is also a positive relation: it is within the natural
world that human behavior arises in the first place. Hence, without a world in which to live, we
would not live the lives that are constrained by this world. Although this is a seemingly simple
point, I think it is often overlooked and must be kept in mind as we precede into the following
analysis.
Fast-forwarding to the early modern period, we find an increasingly important social desire
to understand nature in a particular way, i.e. scientifically. Early proponents of science such as
Rene Descartes, Francis Bacon, and Isaac Newton among others delineated the newfound
scientific method. Importantly for these new theorizers, modern science was to be distinguished
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from the science of antiquity. A new precision and rigor, such as that found in the field of
mathematics was required. Hence, the new science was grounded in mathematical analysis.
Heidegger demonstrates that, unlike Aristotle’s ontology, the mathematization of modern science
equalized all beings by assuming they all exist according to the same principles. Aristotle argued
that heavenly bodies behaved differently than earthly bodies. This is because entities are
distinguished based upon their nature in the hierarchy of beings. Modern mathematics equalizes
this hierarchy by assuming all entities must behave according to the same basic laws. Newton, the
pioneer of mathematical physics, provides us with one such law, i.e. gravity. This allows modern
physicists to treat all objects, whether heavenly or earthly, in the same manner. Doing so provides
the physicist with optimal control in his pursuit to understand nature. With a firm grasp of the
mathematical principles underlying all beings, one can, in principle, understand all beings.1
This story demonstrates the tendency of modernity to emphasize rigorous control over all
beings. In the philosophy of Francis Bacon, we find an account of man’s calling to control nature
by understanding it as if it were something man-made. He writes, “she [i.e. nature] is put in
constraint, molded, and made as it were new by art and the hand of man; as in things artificial”
(Bacon 1870, 294). As a Christian, Bacon believed we are made in the image of God. This provides
us with certain capacities that only are only attributable absolutely to God. Most notably, for our
purposes, this provides man with the capacity to create according to a perfected logic, i.e. God’s
logic. God created the heavens according to such a logic. Humanity is thus given the power to
constrain nature via creation, “as in things artificial,” and by doing so we are liberated from nature
in a manner we share only with the lord. God creates existence, but is not controlled by his creation.

For Heidegger’s treatment of the mathematization of being in contrast to Aristotle’s ontology, see Heidegger
2010c.
1
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Likewise, for Bacon, when man is able to constrain nature, man is liberated from the control
previously exerted by nature without being controlled by his creation. Hence, Bacon’s utopia, as
described in New Atlantis, is a society determined by the technological innovations of those
scientists who have sufficiently gained control over nature. From this perspective, technology is
conceptualized as an entirely liberating force. No longer will nature determine human activity
because ‘man’ has found the ability to control ‘her’ via technological innovations.2 Note that these
technological innovations required the mathematization of nature in which all beings were
equalized such that they exist according to the same laws. In other words, all beings are
conceptualized from the perspective of a single ontological framework.
This position, however, assumes that technology is a neutral means to an end providing us
with absolute control over technology whenever we use it. If technology were inherently valueladen, then it is possible that its values eclipse ours which would undermine any control we
might’ve otherwise had. If this is the case, then the above description may conceal more truths
concerning human autonomy than it reveals. As it stands, the above description suggests that
technology does nothing but improve human autonomy by increasing the level of control we have
over our own becoming. Technology will help us construct a perfectly ordered society such as
Bacon’s New Atlantis where we will presumably be as free as gods. But if technology is itself
autonomous, and not merely a neutral instrument, then we may be mistaking a threat to our
autonomy for an enhancement. In his lecture “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger
argues that technology is not simply a neutral means to an end. Although ‘correct,’ this
instrumental definition of technology conceals technology’s ontological essence. To develop an

2

For an excellent description of the contiguity of dominion over women and dominion over nature, see Merchant
2002.
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authentically free relationship to technology, we must understand it ontologically as what it
essentially is.
To understand technology’s essence, according to Heidegger, we must look towards the
essence of instrumentality, which as a type of causality, is ontologically grounded in causality.
Whenever a means is used to bring about an end, the end is both caused and effected. All causes
are the cause of an effect insofar as they are responsible for the presencing, or coming into being,
of the effect. Both causality and instrumentality are thus essentially a bringing forth of something
into being that was not previously there. Causality, and thus instrumentality, and thus technology,
are all ontologically grounded in what has been translated as revealing, or unconcealing – i.e.
alētheia. Heidegger argues that the primal insight hidden within our contemporary notion of truth
(i.e. the Greek alētheia) has been lost throughout philosophy’s history. He claims the alētheia is
the essence of truth, which, in modern culture, means the correctness of a subject’s representation
of an object. But alētheia, from the Greek perspective (i.e. our intellectual ancestors), is more
primordial than this description which presupposes an ontological distinction between subject and
object. ‘Lethe’ means concealment, or forgetfulness, which, in Greek mythology, refers to a river
in Hades that eradicates all memories. A-lētheia thus means un-concealment.3 Causality,
instrumentality, and technology are all essentially grounded in unconcealment insofar as they all
describe the coming into being of beings, i.e. coming out of concealment into unconcealment,
which is essentially the revealing of truth prior to any ontological dualism.4

3

Socrates, one might argue, conceptualizes truth as ‘un-forgetfulness’ in the Meno.
The unconcealment of truth refers to the event in which being itself is revealed. This ontological description of
truth is thus presupposed in any account of truth as the correctness of representation of objective affairs for a
subject. The event of unconcealment is an integrated whole which conceptualizes being revealed (i.e. a world
composed of objects) as equi-primordial with the revealing of being (i.e. a subject experiencing a world).
4
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Instrumentality, and thus technology, are unique modes of unconcealment. Technological
unconcealment relies upon a human to bring forth that which is being unconcealed. Heidegger
traces this distinction back to the Greek concepts of physis and techne. Physis brings itself forth,
e.g. nature. Nature’s incessant revealing does not depend upon humans in order to bring it forth; it
simply brings itself forth. Techne refers to the various crafts and artworks that are brought forth
by human agents. But modern technology, he argues, does not bring forth beings into open
unconcealment wherein it becomes an infinitely unique being in itself; on the contrary, it
challenges beings to be unconcealed as mere raw material to be ordered efficiently. The essence
of modern technology is this challenge to equalize all beings as mere raw material, and order said
raw material efficiently. As we saw above, modern science demands all beings to be revealed as
quantifiable such that they can be understood from the perspective of mathematics. This process
of revealing beings as essentially quantifiable threatens to conceal the non-quantifiable qualities
of being. As essentially raw material, beings challenged by modern technology have been stripped
of their non-quantifiable properties. Moreover, this challenge is not restricted to technological
artifacts, but is extended to include all beings, including nature, which would have previously been
revealed as physis. Other modes of revealing, such as physis, are thus eclipsed by the challenging
of modern technology which equalizes all beings by transforming them into raw material. Thus,
by inherently encompassing all of being and equalizing all beings by reducing them to a single
ontological essence, the essence of modern technology challenges all beings by predefining them
ontologically. Being is no longer brought forth and granted with a life of its own, as it were.
To continue to refer to this mode of revealing as ‘technology’ would be misleading.
Commonly conceived, technology refers to particular beings that are created by humans.
Heidegger’s claim is not that technology, as commonly conceived, is a mode of revealing, but that
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the existence of modern technologies is grounded in a particular mode of revealing. This is what
he refers to as the Gestell. In German, Gestell may mean rack, or frame. For Heidegger, this word
is used to denote the mode of revealing that ‘enframes’ all being into one all-encompassing
ontological framework that challenges all beings to be raw material ordered efficiently. Thus, it is
usually translated as enframing. By challenging humanity, the Gestell transforms our world into
nothing but a large set of exploitable materials. By doing so, the world is revealed as essentially
exploitable and therefore controllable. The Gestell is why “man, precisely as the one threatened,
exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth” (332). It is the Gestell, as a mode of revealing, that
paves the way for the development of modern science and technology and the control that these
practices provide. Therefore, the Gestell is what liberates us from the constraints of nature. But,
we have yet to understand the nature of the Gestell’s challenge and its relation to human autonomy.
Could it be that it undermines human autonomy, while creating the illusion that we are more
autonomous than before?
Understanding the Gestell’s threat to autonomy: what is autonomy?
Insofar as we are the ones challenged to reveal being as exploitable matter, we are
challenged “more originally” than the beings with which we engage. Heidegger cites the increasing
talk of “human resources” and the demand placed upon the public to consume the material that has
been exploited and transformed into a consumable product.5 By challenging us to reveal all beings
as exploitable matter, we are challenged to reveal ourselves as exploitable matter. Yet, as we saw,
the Gestell is essentially grounded in unconcealment – it is a mode of revealing, i.e.

5

Specifically, he describes how the public is challenged to “swallow” what is printed in newspapers, which reflects
the challenge placed upon a forest to reveal itself as a collection of wood which can be exploited for a variety of
purposes, one of which is paper (Heidegger 2010d, 323).
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unconcealment. But by extending its reign equally across all of being, i.e. all of unconcealment, it
threatens to conceal its own essence; in other words, it threatens to conceal unconcealment itself.
Unconcealment is increasingly concealed the more deeply the Gestell becomes entrenched within
our culture. As the Gestell is increasingly assumed as the standard mode of revealing, the event of
the revelation of being itself loses its mysterious character and is assumed as necessarily given.
This process of assuming the Gestell as the only possible mode of revealing is simultaneously the
processual concealing of unconcealment. This process thus threatens to conceal our essence as the
“guardians of truth” by transforming us into exploitable matter. It continuously challenges
humanity to approach “the possibility of pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed
in ordering, and of deriving all [of our] standards on this basis” (331). In this sense, the Gestell is
autonomous – it determines the way in which humans relate to all beings provided we are under
its spell. For this reason, the autonomy of the Gestell threatens to undermine human autonomy.
But as we saw above, technology seems to liberate us thereby increasing our autonomy.
Heidegger warns of this, however, when he says that we will posture ourselves as “lords of the
earth” despite the fact that we are the ones originally challenged. Thus, I argue that the Gestell
undermines human autonomy by constructing an inauthentic conception of autonomy that becomes
accepted theoretically and enacted practically. This inauthentic conception is the grounded in an
inauthentic conception of self. Not only does the Gesell lead to an inauthentic conception of
autonomy, but, according to its own logic, it simultaneously reduces this conception to an
ontological impossibility. By challenging human beings to reveal all beings as raw materials, we
are eventually challenged to understand ourselves as raw materials. Consequently, the Gestell
leads to the conception that autonomy is impossible because there is no causally independent mind
distinct from the world of material beings – all that exists is the world of material beings. In the
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following, I explicate both the inauthentic conception of autonomy and the increasingly popular
notion that autonomy is illusory.
What I am calling an inauthentic conception of autonomy refers to the traditional6
conception of autonomy discussed by proponents of relational autonomy, which will be discussed
shortly.7 This traditional conception traces back to Cartesian dualism8. It supposes that humans are
actually non-material souls, or minds, that are causally isolated from the material world. It is this
causal independence that supposedly gives us our freedom. If we were not causally independent,
we would be determined by the causal matrix that determines all events in the material world. This
conception, I argue, is a product of the Gestell. By reducing all being to exploitable matter, there
is no room for human consciousness, freedom, or autonomy. All beings are essentially matter
enframed within a causal matrix. The possibility that this causal matrix may be understood and
therefore absolutely controlled and manipulated by a consciousness that understands all the facts
of the world leads to the worry that human freedom is impossible.9 Nevertheless, humans are
conscious, free, and autonomous (or so many of us would like to think). Therefore, many believe
that we must be ontologically distinct from the material world. Moreover, it is this causal isolation
that allows us to be the manipulators, regulators, controllers, and “lords of the earth”. In a world
of exploitable matter, human beings are ontologically detached as the exploiters. Theoretically,

6

‘Traditional’ autonomy, here, simply refers to non-relational conceptions of autonomy. I borrow this language
from the feminist literature which distinguishes between relational and non-relational (i.e. traditional) conceptions
of autonomy. See Freeman 2011.
7
For a discussion of the similarities between Heidegger’s philosophy and relational autonomy, see Freeman 2011.
She critiques traditional autonomy from both a Heideggerian and a feminist perspective, which demonstrates why
both perspectives should endorse a relational conception of autonomy as opposed to the traditional conception.
8
It may be more precise to understand the traditional conception of autonomy and self as rooted, not only in
Cartesian thought, but Kantian philosophy as well.
9
Daniel Dennett, for example, argues that our worry that causal determinism undermines human freedom simply
reflects the irrational fear that some ‘bogeyman’ is capable of controlling human behavior provided they
understand and can manipulate the causal matrix that constitutes our being (Dennett 1984).
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this position has been endorsed by countless philosophers. Practically, this conception seems to
permeate our egoistic modern culture which emphasizes independence, control, and the lack of
reliance upon others.
This position, however, is reduced to absurdity by the increasingly assumed mode of
revealing, i.e. the Gestell. By equalizing all beings, there is no room for human ‘privilege.’
Humans, too, are reduced to exploitable matter. The notion of an un-orderable, uncontrollable,
causally isolated being that cannot be enframed within the Gestell is increasingly considered
impossible. From this perspective, human autonomy is an illusion. There is only the material world
that inherently orders itself, and we are simply moments in its unfolding. From this perspective,
we are merely materials subject to the unfolding of fate. But it is the Gestell that reveals the world
as such. Theoretically, this position has been endorsed by an increasing number of philosophers
who reject the existence of free will.10 Practically, this conception seems to be enacted by people
who suggest that one cannot help but do what one’s material body has fated one to do. For example,
I would argue that there is reason to believe that this way of thinking is leading to an increase in
pharmaceutical use to treat ‘mental disorders,’ which are increasingly being reduced to
malfunctions in the brain. Psychological conditions, from this perspective, supervene on material
processes, and therefore the only way to change one’s psychological condition is to alter the
material processes in our nervous system.
We are thus left with two competing views concerning human autonomy from the
perspective of the Gestell. Notice that both conceptualize autonomy in the same way – that is, to
be autonomous, we must be causally isolated minds that control and regulate the material world.
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see Pereboom 2007.
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From one perspective (let’s call it autonomous dualism), we are autonomous insofar as we are
ontologically distinct from the material world. From the other perspective (let’s call it fatalistic
materialism), this ontological distinction is simultaneously assumed to be the only possible
conception of autonomy and is considered to be false, which implies that autonomy is illusory.
Both are responses to the Gestell. Either we are distinct from the world revealed as exploitable
matter, or we are not. If we are, we are autonomous minds causally independent from the material
world, and it is from this position of causal isolation that we exert our control over the world. If
we are not, autonomy is an illusion. This raises the following questions: What is the authentic
nature of human being? Is there an authentic conception of autonomy grounded in an authentic
conception of human being that avoids the problems mentioned above? And, if so, how does the
Gestell relate to authentic human autonomy? Does the Gestell eradicate human autonomy by
concealing the authentic essence of human being?
The notion of ‘authentic autonomy’ suggests a conceptualization of autonomy that is true
to the ontological structure of human being. Autonomy may be defined as a sort self-direction of
one’s becoming. Understanding this concept requires understanding what we truly are, for it is
what we truly are, if anything, that is capable of such self-direction. Theoretical constructions of
the ‘self’may correspond to inauthentic self-conceptions which thwart self-direction in a practical
sense. For example, theoretical conceptions of self compatible with the Gestell may lead to an
inauthentic conception of autonomy guiding humanity in our everyday lives. As suggested above,
this may lead to an illusory conception autonomy that conceals the fact that our autonomy is being
undermined behind the illusion of increased human control. Alternatively, authentic selfconceptions would presumably increase autonomy by revealing practical ways in which we may
increase our autonomy authentically.
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In his attempt to understand human being authentically, Heidegger’s philosophy is
essentially a post-Cartesian, or anti-Cartesian, philosophy. In Being and Time, Heidegger describes
the ontological structure of human being as Da-sein, or ‘being-there’. This denotes the way in
which humans are (-sein) always there (Da) thrown into a world. Unlike Descartes who claims he
can doubt the existence of an external world but cannot doubt his own being, Heidegger argues
that Descartes’ being is only revealed against the backdrop of an unconcealed world. Thus, Dasein
is equi-primordially being-in-the-world, and not a detached causally isolated subject. Conceptual
distinctions such as subject and object, mind and matter, and thought and substance are
fundamentally derived from this structurally unified phenomenon. He also describes this unified
phenomenon wherein a world is revealed as a temporal clearing. As Dasein, we find ourselves
thrown into a temporal clearing wherein beings are revealed as essentially historical, i.e. within
time. Each being has a necessary past, and a multiplicity of possible futures. It this primordial
structure that stands, as it were, before itself and its own becoming that constitutes the being that
we are. Therefore, the ontological source of human autonomy must be understood as
fundamentally rooted in our being qua temporal clearing.
As beings who have some implicit understanding of being in our being11, humans tend
towards either concealing or unconcealing this implicit understanding. Concealed, we become lost
within our everyday interpretation of being and simply assume its reign. Unconcealed, we are
given over, as it were, to our authentic being as the temporal clearing, and the contingency of the
frameworks that structure the revealing of the world is revealed. What is concealed by the Gestell
is its ontological ground, namely the temporal clearing. And by doing so, it conceals its own
contingency as a mode of revealing and asserts itself as an ontological necessity. In other words,
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See Heidegger 2008.
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the world is necessarily revealed as a set of exploitable materials. But when we become exposed
to our essential self as the clearing, we are “held out into the nothing” and are thus capable of
grasping the inherent emptiness of the Gestell (Heidegger 2010a, 103). Not only what is present,
but “what is absent, too, cannot be as such unless it presences in the free space of the clearing”
(Heidegger 2010e, 444). And what is absent in the unconcealment of the enframed world of the
Gestell is the possibility of a world revealed that isn’t enframed. When we are opened up to the
free space of the clearing, we are thus opened up to a free relation with the essence of technology
insofar as we are opened to the possibility of choosing it or not.12 Only in the free space of the
clearing is human being opened up to an understanding of itself and the structures that shape its
becoming.
Unlike the Cartesian subject, this temporal clearing is not causally independent. It is
essentially interdependent as it is temporally constituted by its being thrown into the history of
being. Thus, ontologically, there is no proper way to understand individual autonomy distinct from
the more general autonomy of being. From one perspective, it would be accurate to say that the
entire history of being manifests and understands itself through human being, and from another
perspective, it would be accurate to say that human being is the manifestation of the history of
being and therefore understands itself through this history. In on other words, our autonomy is
intimately interwoven into the autonomy of being itself – we are temporally situated beings
intertwined into a history that is simultaneously directing its own becoming and granting us a mode
of revealing to understand being and direct our own becoming. In this sense, both the Gestell and
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human autonomy are participants in a sort of interdependent actor network.13 Nothing in the
network has absolutely autonomy; it is always relative. Quite similarly, in Buddhist philosophy,
the absolute interdependence of being is considered to imply the groundlessness of any essential
self. Alan Wallace argues that, because of this, Buddhist debates concerning ‘freedom’ do not
concern its absolute existence or non-existence, but ways that increase it and ways that decrease
it.14 Autonomy is thus never absolute, but relative. So as a temporal clearing always shaped by the
history of being, our autonomy is both relative and interdependent upon the autonomy of others
and the ontological free space opened up by the unconcealment of being in general.
Given this account of authentic autonomy, what is its relationship to the Gestell? As we
saw in the first section, the Gestell threatens to conceal its own ontological ground by concealing
unconcealment itself. In this way, it threatens to conceal the human essence (as the temporal
clearing) as well. Humans are transformed into either exploitable material or ontologically distinct
minds causally isolated from the material world. By transforming our conception of our self as
such, the Gestell either creates an inauthentic conception of autonomy or reduces the conception
of autonomy to absurdity. But if the Gestell’s autonomy is ontologically grounded in the autonomy
of being itself, which also acts as the ground of human autonomy, can the Gestell ever truly
eradicate human autonomy?
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Bruno Latour argues that humans do not absolutely control technology, nor does technology absolutely control
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2009)
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Does the Gestell absolutely eradicate human autonomy?
To truly eradicate human autonomy, the Gestell must absolutely conceal its own
ontological ground from the very being in which it is grounded, namely human being qua temporal
clearing. The equalizing nature of the Gestell suggests that this is an actual possibility. With all
beings challenged, there is no room for any being to avoid the challenge, including human being.
The history of being, i.e. the history of unconcealment, may reach its pinnacle in the absolute
concealment of unconcealment itself. Once this happens, humans would no longer be autonomous.
The Gestell would reveal the world as orderable, and humans would go along ordering it.
Captivated by the illusion that we are in absolute control, there would be room for questioning the
reign of the Gestell. Slowly, as its reign became more deeply entrenched in human thought, we
would lose the possibility of unconcealing our true essence.
Many dystopian depictions of our future seem to reflect this possibility. In the novel We,
for example, Yevgeny Zamyatin describes a future society wherein humans are no longer named,
but numbered, and are challenged to perpetuate the technological society that has been efficiently
organized to maximize stability. The citizens of this society have no other duty than the rational
ordering of a world already revealed and understood ontologically as essentially exploitable. Their
existence is not only necessary for the perpetuation of the technological state, but the perpetuation
of the state is necessary for their continued existence. Similarly, in the novel The Machine Stops,
E.M. Forster depicts an underground society wherein all humans live out their days in utter
isolation, connected to the world via an elaborate machine that provides for their every need.
Interestingly, the characters in the novel are no longer captivated by what Heidegger calls the
mystery of being. Knowledge has been reduced to the simple accumulation of facts. But as the
machine begins to fail, the overly dependent humans are incapable of anticipating such failure.
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They are incapable of conceiving an existence beyond their lives in the machine. Challenged to be
mere parts in the perpetuation of the machine, they have no viable way of existing once it fails.
Although these are fictitious representations of the relationship between humans and
technology, they demonstrate a culturally present fear that technology could undermine human
autonomy absolutely and make us subservient to its reign. Moreover, they demonstrate a very
practical reason for believing we may become subservient. Once our existence becomes materially
dependent upon technology, we may have no other choice but to reveal the world from the
perspective of the Gestell in order to perpetuate the modern technological infrastructure upon
which we are necessarily dependent. For a similar reason, Andrew Feenberg rejects Heidegger’s
account of the Gestell. From his perspective, the Gestell leaves us no way to salvage human
autonomy in any culture permeated by modern technology. Once the shared essence of the Gestell
and human being is concealed, it is forever lost. Feenberg interprets Heidegger’s response to the
Gestell as one of passivity.15 We simply allow the reign of the Gestell to take over, presumably
because we have no other choice.
However, both of the above mentioned novels describe personal struggles to move beyond
the technological world dominating their lives. In We, for example, the protagonist, D-503, meets
a young woman who defies the law by smoking, drinking, and openly expressing her sexual
desires. At one point, the two characters escape the technologically enframed society by visiting
an ancient site, which suggests the continuing presence of a pre-technological culture. The anxiety
caused by these illegal actions lead D-503 to start having dreams, a sign of mental illness from the
perspective of the overly rationalized culture. Towards the end, D-503’s brain is mechanically
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reorganized so that he will perform more efficiently as the human resource that he is. Despite this
transformation in the protagonist, the society begins to unravel, as a rebel group begins to develop
strength and birds begin to reenter the city that had literally been enclosed within a technological
bubble which had concealed the sky. The theme of the novel is captured in the young woman’s
proclamation that there is no highest number, and therefore no final revolution. Zamyatin, at least,
does not seem to think that modern technology may ever absolutely transform our understanding
of being. In other words, it may never absolutely conceal its ontological ground in the free space
of the clearing.
Similarly, in The Machine Stops, the protagonist yearns to escape the isolation of his place
in the machine. He desires to use his body, unlike the majority of his fellow comrades who spend
most of their lives in a single room engaging only their rational intellect. Upon escaping from the
machine, he is captivated by the air circulating on the surface which he believes embodies the
spirits of the past. Unlike his mother who cannot appreciate seeing stars in the sky, he is enamored
with his experience on the earth’s surface. In the end, when the machine actually stops, we learn
that a society of people had been surviving on the earth’s surface all along. Forster, too, seems to
reject the possibility that the Gestell will ever reign absolutely. Both authors warn only of human
arrogance and the possibility that we will be swept away by the false promises offered by the
Gestell. Ultimately, any constructed human society will fail if it is incapable of responding to
change. This raises the following questions: Does Heidegger conceptualize the Gestell in a similar
fashion? Can it ever reign absolutely? Or is there no final mode of revealing that conceals, once
and for all, unconcealment itself?
Many Heideggerians, I believe, would argue that the Gestell does not necessarily conceal
itself absolutely. For example, Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa cite Heidegger’s optimistic
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description of the autobahn. Winding through the country side, the autobahn is no mere
technological device. Contrasted with the endlessly straight roads that stretch across America’s
mid-west, the autobahn was not constructed solely upon the value of efficiency. As a cultural work
of art, it gathers the German people and countryside revealing itself as more than exploitable
matter, but as a national work of art.16 This implies that there is some room for cultural autonomy
even in highly technological scenarios. Likewise, Albert Borgmann argues that technologies are
not fated to be revealed as ‘devices’ but may revealed as ‘focal things’ capable of being integrated
in an autonomously chosen human practice.17 Moreover, Dreyfus argues that the free relation to
technology for which Heidegger is searching in his lecture requires a new god, or culturally
unifying conception of the meaning of being. This ‘god’ is thus capable of reestablishing our
autonomy and overcoming the threat posed by the Gestell.18 Thus, Heidegger scholars certainly
seem to think that the Gestell will not necessarily eradicate human autonomy, even if we become
materially dependent upon technologies.
So does the Gestell universally enframe our entire conception of being? To be clear, there
are two conceptions of ‘universal’ that must be distinguished. According to one conception of
‘universal’, the answer is obviously yes. By challenging us to equalize all beings as exploitable
matter, there is no being that is not challenged by the Gestell, including ourselves. In this sense,
the Gestell universally enframes all beings. On the other hand, however, the Gestell seems entirely
compatible with momentary breaks by individual agents from its reign in the increasingly
technologically permeated world. As Dreyfus and Spinosa suggest, we can temporarily break from
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the Gestell’s reign by appreciating the gathering capacity of modern technological devices, such
as a highway bridge. The first sense in which the Gestell enframes our entire conception of being
concerns its universal reach into the world of beings. The second sense in which it does not seem
to enframe our entire conception of being reflects the possibility that the Gestell may fail to
universally extend its reign to encompass all people at all times in a given society. In both of the
above novels, all beings are certainly enframed from the perspective of many people most of the
time. But, there are also temporary breaks from such enframing in which the world is revealed
from a different perspective.
With that said, how are we to make sense of Heidegger’s claim that the Gestell threatens
to impose itself absolutely? Is this an absolute imposition in the first sense, but not the second? If
so, then the Gestell does not pose such a dire threat to human autonomy as suggested by Feenberg.
As long as we can temporarily escape the reign of the Gestell in our day to day lives, we are capable
of maintaining some autonomy. Feenberg, as I will demonstrate in the next section, believes that
the universality of the Gestell in the first sense implies that it is universal in the second sense.
Contra Feenberg’s interpretation of Heidegger, I believe that we may have to rely on the Gestell,
but as long as we can break from its reign and choose when to rely on it, we remain autonomous.
As we saw in the first section, nature not only threatens our autonomy but is an essential
background condition for our autonomy. Both nature and the Gestell certainly restrict our freedom
to some extent (when we conceptualize our relationship to them in negative terms), but they also
open up possibilities providing us with a free space in which we may live autonomously (when we
conceptualize our relationship to them in positive terms). This is what is meant by the claim that
authentic autonomy must be conceptualized as interdependent and relative. But, the danger the
Gestell poses seems to be a threat in the second sense – it threatens to reveal the world as
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exploitable matter at all times. Heidegger claims, “the rule of enframing threatens man with the
possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to
experience the call of a more primal truth” (Heidegger 2010d, 333). In other words, the Gestell
threatens us with the possibility that we may never unconceal the world from any other perspective.
Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains that the essence of the Gestell is ambiguous and holds
within it not only the extreme danger, but also the saving power. Feenberg suggests that this saving
power is simply the passivity of giving up autonomy and accepting the reign of the Gestell. Others,
such as Dreyfus, Spinosa, and Iain Thomson, interpret Heidegger much more optimistically. To
adjudicate this debate, I believe we must understand that the Gestell is inherently an historical
claim concerning the ontological understanding of entire societies. Thus, we must be careful to
avoid exaggerating the claim by oversimplifying human history. In the next section, I articulate
the meaning of the Gestell as an historical claim by interpreting Feenberg’s criticism of Heidegger
as an objection to the its validity as an historical claim. I argue that Feenberg misunderstands the
Gestell by failing to understand its relationship, as a culturally dominant mode of revealing, with
the existing individual who is necessarily capable of reflectively questioning.
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2 Responding to Andrew Feenberg’s interpretation (and criticism) of
Heidegger
In this chapter, I explicate more carefully Feenberg’s interpretation of Heidegger.
Specifically, I draw attention to the emphasis he places on understanding the Gestell as an
historical claim. Heidegger argues that Gestell is a mode of revealing grounded in the history of
being. It is contingent insofar as it is a culturally relative phenomenon. In other words, the Gestell
only ‘holds sway’ in certain historical and cultural eras. Heidegger’s claim is that this mode of
revealing characterizes contemporary Western civilization, and its development into its current
state can be traced back to the original ontological theorizing of the ancient Greeks. Feenberg
argues that, as an historical claim, the Gestell is false. He demonstrates this by citing examples of
contemporary modern technologies that do not seem to be ‘enframed’ in the way in which
Heidegger suggests they should be. Explicating this argument is the goal of the first section of the
second chapter.
In the second section, I describe how we can understand the Gestell as an historical claim
by outlining its role in recent European history, particularly from the perspective of German
history. I argue that the Gestell can certainly not determine the unconcealment of every particular
clearing, i.e. every particular person, in a given society at all times. On the contrary, it can only be
understood to challenge every given person at some point or another insofar as they are interwoven
into the dominant culture (and insofar as the Gestell characterizes the dominant culture). Therefore,
the above described stories would be excellent representations of fictitious struggles with the
Gestell. The threat of enframing is the threat that enframing will become the dominant mode of
relating to the world within a particular culture, but it will never undermine its own essential
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ground in the clearing granted to human beings. It can never steal the rebellious spirit of humanity
wherein the dominant culture is critically called into question by some minority of people.
Thus, in the final section, I argue that Feenberg’s critical theory of technology wherein he
hopes to salvage human autonomy from the threat posed by overemphasizing, what he refers to as,
formal rationality may only be supported and more deeply understood by examining its
interdependence upon the ontological framework described by Heidegger. Moreover, I argue that
Feenberg’s project of salvaging human autonomy needs an ontological basis wherein the essence
of human being is more carefully taken into consideration. And given the argument presented in
the first chapter concerning the interdependence between human autonomy and the mode of
revealing granted to us, I argue that Heidegger’s conception of Gelassenheit is precisely the
attitude to cultivate in order to salvage human autonomy from the threat posed by the Gestell. Only
by ‘calmly releasing ourselves,’ ‘opening up to,’ and ‘accepting’ our ontological facticity as a
culture can we respond to the above mentioned threat. It is in the ‘free space of the clearing’ that
we understand our essence and stand before, as it were, the modes of revealing determining our
being. Therefore, it is only within this free space that we may come to truly subordinate the
autonomy of the Gestell to a wider array of human values and a more deeply constructed
conception of human being. Without this ontological component, Feenberg’s political campaign
to salvage human autonomy from the threat posed by modern technologies is, I believe,
incomplete.
Feenberg’s interpretation (and critique) of the Gestell
Feenberg has critiqued Heidegger’s notion of the Gestell for, what I believe to be, two
primary reasons. First, he argues that the Gestell, as an historical claim, is simply false. One such
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example he provides concerns Heidegger’s prediction that, upon entering into the digital age,
knowledge will be reduced to brute information, and technologies such as the computer and
internet will be solely used to distribute information stripped of human significance.19 Quite to the
contrary, however, cyberspace has become the home for many different activities rife with human
significance. Moreover, as a social constructivist thesis might suggest, the claim that some
overarching technical way of viewing the world has determined an entire society’s history, or
perhaps is increasingly determining social history and will absolutely determine it at some future
point, is empirically false.20 There are a plethora of factors determining social history, and our
technical relation to the world is only one factor among many. Although, I agree with Feenberg
that the Gestell should be understood as an historical claim, I do not agree with his interpretation
of its implications as an historical claim.
To defend his interpretation, Feenberg makes an interesting argument. Conceding to Iain
Thomson, he admits that he had previously mistaken Heidegger’s ‘essence of technology’ for a
mere generic type, or simple generalization. Upon this basis, he had critiqued, as I suggested above,
Heidegger’s conception of the Gestell for being too fatalistic and providing no room for reform.
Despite his concession, he states that he is still compelled to endorse the same conclusion. He
argues that Heidegger’s conception of essence wherein the Gestell ‘holds sway’ in technological
settings is akin to Hegel’s notion of concrete universals, which are contrasted with simple
generalizations. Concrete universals are enacted in their instantiations. For example, he discusses
language and culture, and suggests that instances of these are not simply particulars reflecting
some abstract generality, but concrete instances in which culture and language actually come into
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being. The Gestell, he argues, seems to be a sort of concrete universal. If so, then we should expect
the Gestell to, in some way, be “enacted in particular technological arrangements and technically
inspired behaviors” (Feenberg 2000, 447).
Iain Thomson, Feenberg claims, misuses the ontological difference, i.e. the distinction
between what is ontological and what is ontic, to defend Heidegger’s ontological theory without
addressing its ontic implications. In other words, one may argue that Heidegger’s abstract
arrangement of concepts is internally consistent, and ignore his overly nihilistic descriptions of
particular technological situations, which is what Feenberg accuses Thomson of doing. What
makes the Gestell so worrisome is that it inherently tends towards holding sway in all human
relations insofar as it is a concrete universal. This is what gives it its seeming fatalism. For this
reason, Heidegger may be interpreted as making a very specific historical claim. If the Gestell is
enacted in all particular instances of modern technology, and it inherently threatens to hold sway
in all human relations, then one would expect to see all human relations, at all times, to be enframed
by the Gestell in any society permeated by modern technology.
Whether or not the Gestell holds sway in any particular situation, it seems to me, can be
determined by an ontological analysis of the participants in any technical setting. Feenberg worries
that Heidegger’s description of modern technological situations is exaggerated and overly nihilistic
because it understands technology from the perspective of the false essence he has construct, i.e.
the Gestell. Certainly, hydroelectric dams may be revealed to engineers as mere matter functionally
arranged to extract energy from the river which itself has been transformed into mere matter
standing by waiting to be used. This, however, doesn’t reflect the technology itself, i.e. the dam,
but reflects the way in which the people are relating to the dam. Therefore, the dam, and any
particular technology for that matter, may not be revealed as mere exploitable matter, but may
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become a cultural focal point for a community that draws its energy from the river. If this is
possible, then the Gestell hardly seems to be the essence of modern technology insofar as any
particular technology may exist without the Gestell holding sway within its being. Heidegger, of
course, could object and argue that it is not possible. Contra Feenberg, he may claim that the
Gestell holds sway in all technical situations in the modern world. This would imply that he
endorses the interpretation that suggests that the Gestell threatens to hold sway at all times for all
people in a given society, which would undermine human autonomy indefinitely and entirely.
Supposing he would respond to Feenberg in this manner, we are left with an historical debate to
be settled by analyzing the extent to which the Gestell holds sway in modern industrialized
societies. Feenberg, as we have seen, argues that this position is untenable given the ontic facts. In
other words, he believes that an ontological analysis of the participants in many technological
scenarios (e.g. cyberspace) reveals that enframing fails to hold sway. As I suggested above, I
believe that he is right – the Gestell does fail to hold sway in all scenarios involving modern
technologies. However, I am not convinced that Feenberg’s interpretation of the Gestell is
adequate.
Before explicating why I think this, we must first understand Feenberg’s second reason for
critiquing Heidegger’s Gestell. Primarily interested in our technological policies, Feenberg
approaches the question of modern technology from a very practical perspective. He is concerned
with the organization of people and technology and the relations between them. Overcoming
problems associated with modern technology is a political task from Feenberg’s perspective.
Practically oriented, he thus believes that we must accept and embrace modern technology. We no
longer have the choice to reject it outright. For this reason, Feenberg is interested in technological
reformation. The Gestell, according to his interpretation of Heidegger, isn’t quite useful for such
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a program. From Feenberg’s perspective, we must either reject technology outright, or we must
accept the dehumanizing force of the Gestell and allow it to transform and determine our lives.
Although they have their merits, Feenberg’s criticisms conceal more than they reveal. As
a critical theorist, Feenberg is often concerned with the cultural parameters defining what is
‘rational’ and how this influences social organization, human well-being, and, importantly for our
purposes, human autonomy. Heidegger, on the other hand, is concerned with our understanding of
being. Rationality, however, compels us towards accepting and understanding truths concerning
what is. The Gestell shapes and determines the way in which what is is revealed, which certainly
shapes what is considered true and rational. Therefore, Feenberg’s critique of technical rationality,
I believe, can only be supported by Heidegger’s critique of technological revealing. If this is the
case, however, we must respond to Feenberg’s argument that the Gestell, as an historical claim, is
false which is supported by his interpretation of the Gestell. Perhaps, as I believe to be the case,
his interpretation of the Gestell is inadequate. Feenberg conceptualizes it so fatalistically that he
expects all instances of culture since the development of modern technology to be instances of the
Gestell’s holding sway. Heidegger, however, never claimed that the Gestell does determine all
human relations; rather, he argued that the Gestell threatened to determine all human relations.
This threat is due to its innate tendency to conceal itself as a mode of revealing. It challenges
humans to unreflectively adopt its perspective in our relation to the world. And although this threat
tends to undermine our reflective capacities and our understanding of being, it cannot eradicate the
source of its own autonomy, namely the autonomy of being itself. Ontologically, human existence
is the clearing wherein being is revealed, understood, and directed in its becoming. Therefore,
humans may be threatened by the Gestell, but may never be completely overtaken by it.
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Understanding the Gestell as an historical claim
To understand how the Gestell may pose a major threat to human relations without
completely determining them, a brief description of Heidegger’s cultural context is in order.
Moreover, I believe such a description will demonstrate the actual meaning of the Gestell as an
historical claim. In the early twentieth century, Germany was rapidly developing industrially.
Threatened by the imperial forces of France and Russia who lusted after hegemony in the lands
directly beyond their borders, Germany’s existence as a nation, from the perspective of many
Germans, depended upon having adequate quantities of resources to defend and sustain the rapidly
growing number of people. More efficiently organizing the military’s resources, both its
technological and human resources, became a top priority, and this must be done in union with a
more efficiently organized industry and agriculture. But why was such a gathering and ‘enframing’
of resources necessary for Germany to maintain its identity in the modern world?
I would argue that the Gestell may be understood as an historical explanation capable of
answering such a question. So how should we understand the Gestell as an historical claim?
Heidegger argues that it refers to the present condition of an ontological development tracing back
to ancient Greece. Thus, it is deeply embedded into the history of European culture, and not simply
Germany. Over time, European culture has been slowly dominated by the Gestell. Of course,
humans throughout history have related to beings as mere resources to be used, and thus were
challenged by the Gestell.21 But in Europe, it was increasingly being developed and consolidated
as the ‘correct’ mode of revealing. Those under its spell were incredibly successful – that is,
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scientists, technicians, technocrats, engineers, accountants, businessmen, and so on. Naturally,
those folks were led to a felt need to expand in order to enframe more resources, which were often
human resources that would be used for the cultivation of agricultural resources such as sugar,
tobacco, and cotton. The earth became a finite collection of raw materials (including human
beings) that could be manipulated and transformed into commodities.
But due to the earth’s finitude, (often violent) competition for these exploitable lands filled
with resources (human, animal, plant, and mineral) became a political standard. The nations that
tended to endorse the Gestell and reveal the world as such began to supplant other cultures
spreading modern technology’s reign. Germany, Britain, France, America, Russia, Italy, the
suddenly ‘Europeanized Japan’, and others, as time went on, were simply responding to the
pressures created as beings were increasingly revealed as exploitable. Even the sense of cultural
superiority and the notion of a civilizing mission can be understood as a sort of ‘equalization’
wherein one way of living is considered more rational and therefore should be spread everywhere.
And of course one of the cultural notions most commonly spread was that the world is not
composed of spiritually infused beings as many ‘natives’ and ‘savages’ thought, but merely
exploitable matter.
The above account reflects the rise in dominance of the Gestell as a mode of revealing, and
for that reason must be understood against the backdrop of a much more complicated history than
might be suggested above. It certainly isn’t to suggest that other modes did not persist. Music, art,
handmade artifacts, and poetry continue to be an integral part of culture, but they were increasingly
marginalized and overshadowed by modern technology, consumerism, militarization, and the
efficient ordering of society in general. As mentioned earlier, Feenberg critiques Heidegger (and
Jean-François Lyotard for that matter) for predicting that the computer’s integration into society
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will transform language into symbolic code stripped of human significance. Feenberg points out,
and rightly so, that this does not reflect the way in which the computer has been used given the
prominence of social media, online blogs, news, and so on. Therefore, the Gestell, if we are to
understand it adequately as an historical explanation, must not be understood as the only mode of
revealing possible for all people in a social setting. Rather, it may only be understood as the
dominant and ‘most rational’ mode of revealing. Primo Levi, for example, explains that, despite
the rampant dehumanization during the Holocaust wherein human beings were reduced to, not
only exploitable, but also disposable, raw material, a sense of humanity could be salvaged and
found by communicating with others in one’s native language, which temporarily concealed the
aggressive German commands that dominated one’s linguistic interactions.
When we consider Heidegger’s philosophy as a response to, and an attempt to understand,
European society in the early twentieth century, we can certainly understand his worry that the
Gestell was becoming increasingly dominant. And of course this was reaffirmed by his
understanding of recent European history, which had rapidly changed over the past few centuries,
accompanied by his understanding of the history of philosophy culminating in the nihilism of
Friedrich Nietzsche. What is increasingly assumed as obvious is that the world is a collection of
exploitable matter stripped of qualitative characteristics and reduced to only those features that are
quantifiable. Stripped of meaning, human beings are reduced to detached and isolated egos
compelled to rationally order the world of exploitable matter as they are driven by their will to
power. This, according to Heidegger and Nietzsche, is the ontological world-view embedded in
Western culture.
Recalling our authentic nature as a temporal clearing, we should remember that we
essentially stand before, as it were, modes of revealing in our being. We are of course thrown into
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cultures that determine our exposure to various ways of understanding the world, and therefore,
we can never stray beyond our horizon. Nevertheless, we have an implicit understanding of being
in our being, and by reflectively opening up to a questioning of our basic assumptions concerning
being, being itself is opened up to the possibility of understanding itself through us, which in turn
opens us up to a free space. But what occurs in such a free space? Iain Thomson describes the
Gestell as akin to an ambiguous image, such as Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit.22 Hidden within it is
the potential to be unconcealed as either a duck or a rabbit, but not both simultaneously. Likewise,
the Gestell, when reflectively understood for what it is, reveals itself in its ambiguity. As both the
extreme danger and saving power, the Gestell is essentially ambiguous. The threat it poses is its
tendency to conceal itself by extending its reign equally throughout the entire realm of being.
When this happens, we are not opened up to the free space wherein we can choose the Gestell in
its saving capacity, for it is this choice that the free space provides insofar as it reveals the
ambiguity. Failing to reflectively interact with the Gestell in our everyday assumption that it is
simply given leads to the erratic unfolding of the Gestell in both its saving and dangerous
capacities. Technology certainly helped liberate us from certain natural restrictions increasing our
quality of life, but it also helped create some of the most tragic and cataclysmic events in human
history. The more deeply entrenched its reign is in human affairs, the more likely we are to create
societies in which children grow up incapable of reflectively questioning the Gestell’s basic
assumptions. My worry is that if we do not learn to reflectively question the Gestell we will not
only continue to conceal our humanity, but we will also perpetuate the erratic unfolding of modern
technology that has characterized its historical genealogy.
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Let me explain. The history of modern technology is a history of wonderful human
achievement and liberation alongside human catastrophe and enslavement. The industrial
revolution was first preceded by violent imperial expansion and enslavement of other humans,
mostly those in the Southern hemisphere (Africans, Asians, and native South Americans). This
process provided the material basis for the revolution. Although controversial, some historians
argue that slavery was only abandoned due to growing economic pressures to turn slaves, i.e.
workers, into consumers, a notion adopted by Henry Ford.23 What is crucial here is how material
improvements in the quality of life brought about by modern technology were accompanied by the
transformation of human beings into exploitable material slaves and then into exploitable workers
and consumers. Whether or not this was necessary for the development of modern technology, I
am uncertain, but I do not believe its perpetuation is necessary. Moreover, after modern industry
hit its first major peak at the turn of the twentieth century, Europe (and the rest of its global empire)
was thrust into two wars that, due to modern technology, were the most catastrophic wars in human
history. But from these catastrophic wars arose many technologies that were later used to increase
the well-being of many humans, e.g. nuclear energy, various chemicals and medicines, etc. This,
I believe, demonstrates the essential ambiguity of modern technology and its erratic consequences
when the Gestell holds sway as the dominant framework.
The reason for modern technology’s erratic unfolding, I contend, is because we have failed,
as a society, to adequately reveal, rather unconceal, the essence of the Gestell. It has been
increasingly assumed to be the ‘right’ mode of revealing. Poetry, the arts, music, literature,
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philosophy, and so on have been reduced to purposelessness unless they can produce some material
benefits, usually in the form of capital. But to salvage human autonomy, I argue, requires us to
open ourselves up to technology’s essence, wherein the ambiguity and contingency of the Gestell
may reveal itself. From the vantage point of the clearing, the essential holding sway of modern
technology is brought into the light, as it were. And in this free space, humans are truly capable of
choosing when to understand beings as raw material, which allows us to subordinate the Gestell
to other human values and modes of understanding being. Thus, if we recall Feenberg’s criticism
that the Gestell provides no basis for a practical reorganization of society and a salvaging of human
autonomy, we can now see that this criticism is unfounded. If we are to salvage human autonomy,
and thereby reintegrate modern technology into human society more effectively, we must accept
the challenge of the Gestell. For it is only by accepting its challenge, facing the danger, and
understanding its ontological essence that we can truly move beyond its reign. Both Heidegger and
Feenberg agree, modern technology is here to stay – we may only reorient ourselves with respect
to its presence. But I disagree with Feenberg that Heidegger’s account calls for passive acceptance
of the eradication of human autonomy. On the contrary, I argue that this acceptance is the ground
for salvaging human autonomy.
The compatibility between Feenberg’s project and Heidegger’s ontology
For this reason, I believe Heidegger’s account and Feenberg’s are much more congruent
than Feenberg suggests. He writes, “Heidegger, for example, condemns modern society as
nihilistic and attempts to conceive a philosophical alternative to autonomy” (177). However, as I
have suggested, I argue that Heidegger’s account only tries to reconceive a philosophical
alternative to autonomy insofar as autonomy is conceptualized as what I have referred to as
inauthentic autonomy. His philosophy can be understood as an attempt to understand human being
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ontologically, and thus an attempt to understand autonomy ontologically.24 This leads to
conclusions that an ego-centered culture may not accept. The interdependent matrix from which
we have poetically sprung forth is a history of being self-directing its own becoming through
humanity. Our autonomy is always relative and shared with this historical becoming. The
autonomy of the Gestell reflects the autonomy of the subject, both of which trace their origin to
the autonomy of being. The entire history of being, I would argue, has been an attempt to selfdirect itself into the attainment of the ultimate good, what Aristotelians have referred to as
flourishing. We are only one link in the chain free to pursue our own flourishing. If we are to
understand our autonomy adequately, we must understand that it is intimately interwoven into the
autonomy of being itself. As some Buddhist philosophers have argued, we may only increase
individual freedom by striving to increase the freedom of all beings.25 Heidegger’s account is thus
akin to a critical theory. By critiquing a traditional conception of autonomy, we may be able to
articulate a more primordial and undistorted conception. And in doing so, we increase the
likelihood that we will flourish.
Feenberg argues that we need a technological holism wherein contextual aspects of
technology’s integration into social contexts are taken into consideration. What he refers to as
formal rationality strips beings of their interdependence in its attempt to equalize all relations by
separating technical objects from their context, primary from secondary qualities, and subject from
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object. Notice how compatible this account is with the Gestell!26 As mere exploitable matter,
technical objects designed for a particular end do not need to vary with respect to particular
contexts as long as the matter to be manipulated may be efficiently manipulated. Likewise,
secondary qualities, which are “everything that is unimportant to the technical project,” i.e.
everything except its qualities as the resource that it is being exploited as, become increasingly
irrelevant as the Gestell begins to dominate (Feenberg 2010, 187). And the particular human
subject is irrelevant when it comes to his or her role as a manipulator of objects, so long as the
objects can be manipulated as needed. In opposition to this historical trend, Feenberg argues that
we need to reintegrate context, secondary qualities, and subjective considerations into our creation
of technology. I see this as a call to quit relating to beings as essentially exploitable matter, but as
meaningful focal points that gather a multiplicity of modes of revealing into the determination of
our becoming.
For Heidegger, Gelassenheit, which may be translated as a sort of calm composure, or as
is commonly used for Heidegger’s technical use of the term – releasement, is the appropriate
response to the reign of the Gestell. As I suggested earlier, Feenberg interprets Gelassenheit as a
sort of passive acceptance of the reign of the Gestell. Alternatively, I argue that the ‘acceptance of
technology’ implied by Heidegger’s conception of Gelassenheit is simply an acceptance of our
facticity, which is a necessary feature of authenticity. Being challenged by the Gestell is our
facticity, and we must accept it. To passively accept its reign is to avoid facing the extreme danger
which is to avoid understanding the Gestell in its essential ambiguity. When we do this, the Gestell
reigns erratically in human affairs by simultaneously creating a society that is increasingly
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improving the standard of life by liberating us from natural threats and threatening our autonomy
by dehumanizing us, which has historically compelled us into some of the most violent
relationships between humans themselves and between humanity and nature. When we calmly
compose ourselves, accept the fact that we are necessarily challenged by the Gestell, and release
ourselves to a free relation to the Gestell by opening up to our essential nature as temporal
clearings, we are able to direct our own becoming more so than before. By understanding the
essence of technology as enframing, and relating to it as one possible mode of revealing among
others, we are able to choose when it is appropriate to enframe the world, and when it is not.
To be clear, this does not provide us with absolute control. What is crucial is understanding
that we become more autonomous by developing a deeper understanding of our essential
constitution. By recovering insights hidden within the dawn of Western philosophy, we are not
returning to an ancient understanding. We truly do understand many aspects of the world that the
Greeks could not, but only at the expense of concealing many insights they understood that we do
not. Heidegger writes, “a painstaking effort to think through still more primally what was primally
thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded
before the coming of the dawn” (Heidegger 2010d, 327). By understanding the ontological source
of the Gestell, we open ourselves up to a deeper understanding of ourselves as the temporal
manifestation of a history of being in its becoming and therefore develop a higher degree of
autonomy over the future of our own becoming. This not a self-generated autonomy, but an
autonomy granted to us by the history of being. It is the autonomy of being itself manifesting itself
through us. But this is our ontological essence – we are the guardians of truth, and the directors of
the becoming of being. To be authentic is to take responsibility for what we essentially are, and
what we essentially are, among other things, is beings challenged by the Gestell.
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Thus, with respect to Feenberg’s technological reform, the social cultivation of
Gelassenheit will help us direct ourselves into a healthier relationship with technology. In other
words, Gelassenheit is precisely what Feenberg’s account promotes. By opening up to the free
space wherein we may more creatively interact with the structures that determine our relation to
being, we are more capable of integrating technology practically into our everyday lives. By
opening ourselves up to an understanding of the way technical objects reveal themselves as more
than mere resources, i.e. the way in which they may be revealed as aesthetic objects or focal things
in our everyday practices, we increase our ability to appropriately contextualize our technical
objects. And by opening up to the multiplicity of ways in which beings may be revealed, we are
essentially opening up to the secondary qualities concealed by the Gestell. Moreover, this is
accomplished by anticipating the multiplicity of ways in which objects are revealed for subjects.
It is no longer assumed that the object will reveal itself as a mere resource. The Gestell challenges
us to assume something that is always false – i.e. that it is the only mode of revealing. And it is by
challenging us to make such a faulty assumption that we are threatened by its extreme danger. But
by understanding why it poses such a threat, we come to understand the Gestell’s contingency and
open ourselves up to a deeper understanding of ourselves and what shapes our relation to being.
Gelassenheit is thus an essential component to technological reform.
To understand what I mean by the social cultivation of Gelassenheit, I will briefly describe
some practical applications. Stefaan Cuypers has argued that an authentic education requires the
teacher to cultivate authentic understanding as opposed to an indoctrinated understanding.27 If I
understand him correctly, this implies that a student must authentically accept what is being taught
for reasons they understand and can articulate instead of implicitly assuming them. I would
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contend that this may never be done absolutely but is nonetheless the ideal epistemic foundation
of education. If we consider STEM education (science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics), it seems as if, from a Heideggerian perspective, that the mode of revealing that
makes these subjects possible is assumed implicitly and is therefore an understanding that is
indoctrinated as opposed to authentically accepted. Thus, a way to reorganize technical education
to salvage human autonomy from the reign of modern technology would be to integrate the
cultivation of Gelassenheit into STEM education, and education in general. This, I argue, should
involve the cultivating within scientists, technologists, engineers, and mathematicians an
awareness and acceptance of the contingency and ambiguity of the mode of revealing that holds
sway within their disciplines. This might involve a deeper awareness of ethical and political
considerations inherent to the application of science and technology; and perhaps even the
cultivation of an artistic and aesthetic awareness within domains such as engineering and
architecture. Although programs of this nature already exist within these fields, technological
considerations and formal rationality still seem to override all other human values. But by opening
up ‘technocrats’ to a richer understanding of human values and an authentic understanding and
acceptance of the Gestell’s contingent and ambiguous nature, we can subordinate the Gestell and
formal rationality to a richer array of human values and modes of understanding being. But this
can only be done if the ‘technocrats’ themselves authentically accept the contingency and
ambiguity of modern technology, i.e. the technocrats must develop Gelassenheit with respect to
the Gestell.
Another application, among many others that could be developed, is within the realm of
psychiatry and psychological disorders. A common trend in the psychiatric community is to treat
human beings as raw material wherein all mental disorders, or ‘illnesses,’ are reduced to a material
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aberration in the person’s biological constitution. Increasingly, our understanding of mental
illnesses is being determined by the technological solutions created to ‘fix’ such physical
aberrations. This has been particularly prevalent with respect to depression, which is, many argue,
a universal phenomenon that can often be treated effectively via therapy. I would argue, however,
that such an account tends to bolster many humans’ inauthentic conception of their own autonomy.
Reduced to raw material, the only way to ‘control’ one’s body is by materially intervening. The
more we prescribe pharmaceuticals when therapy would be more appropriate, the more likely we
are to undermine human autonomy by increasing the number of addicts who cannot direct their
own becoming without pharmaceutical intervention. Moreover, as pharmaceutical prescription
becomes a social norm, the assumed validity of this inauthentic conception of autonomy will
become more entrenched into society. I contend that a way to structurally reorganize clinical
psychiatry to increase human autonomy, as opposed to subordinating it to the will of the Gestell,
is by reorienting its focus upon the therapeutic cultivation of Gelassenheit wherein patients are
taught to calmly accept the person that they are. This involves treating mental illness as a human
problem as opposed to a technical problem. As Vesna Pejnović so elegantly states it (describing
Nietzsche’s conception of autonomy), “Someone who has the spirit to become free is capable of
accepting and affirming oneself as a whole, and rather than seeing the necessity or accepting the
fate of one’s character as an obstacle to action, one sees it as an opportunity for true self
expression” (Pejnović 2014, 27).
The above examples are not intended to provide detailed analyses or prescriptions of how
to go about reorganizing modern society such that human autonomy is salvaged from the reign of
the technological revealing of the world. Rather, they are only intended to provide examples of the
relevance of Gelassenheit in responding to challenges posed and created by the cultural dominance
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of the Gestell. The crucial points can be summarized in the following manner: we must accept the
contingency and ambiguity of the Gestell, which allows us to subordinate it to other human values
and modes of understanding being and thereby avoid the catastrophes caused by its erratic
unfolding when its essence remains concealed; we must cultivate a calm acceptance of who we are
and what we are in order to live autonomously; and we must open ourselves up to the free space
of the clearing wherein we can truly autonomously direct our own becoming by standing before,
as it were, the various possible modes of revealing that have been granted to us. These points, I
argue, are only captured by an understanding of the ontological essence of modern technology
wherein beings are revealed as raw material, i.e. the Gestell, and an understanding that the proper
response to this mode of revealing is an open acceptance of its challenge and a striving to
understand and autonomously respond to said challenge, i.e. Gelassenheit.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe it is important to remember that humans are necessarily challenged
by the Gestell and therefore it is an essential part of our being. Overcoming its reign is not
eradicating it from our lives, but transforming its role. Since human autonomy is relative, it can
only be increased or decreased within a set of contextual parameters. Autonomy is grounded in the
human capacity for thought, and reflection upon the meaning of being. Without reflectively
engaging with the various structures that determine the revealing of the world, our becoming is
determined by these structures. Heidegger’s philosophy, in my view, is a warning concerning the
danger of unreflectively allowing the Gestell to become the dominant mode of revealing. As
Marcuse argues, technological rationality has led to a one dimensional society wherein only one
system of rationality supplants all other human values.28 Similar to Marcuse, Heidegger thinks that
the Gestell is threatening to supplant all other modes of revealing, which threatens to transform
our understanding of ourselves and others into mere exploitable matter. Due to our interdependent
nature as social beings, this undermines our capacity for relating to others qua other, which thwarts
our autonomy as beings who self-direct their own becoming by interacting and depending upon
their fellow beings. Moreover, by transforming ourselves into mere exploitable material, the notion
of autonomy is diluted into a sort of regulative and technical control of our material bodies by a
causally independent subject, or is simply dismissed as an illusion due to the impossibility of a
causally independent subject. Furthermore, the revealing of being is increasingly presupposed and
the authentic source of our being is therefore concealed. Inauthentically, we are held “out into the
nothing” (Heidegger 2010a, 103) as if our “Being has [already] been interpreted in some manner”
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(Heidegger 2008, 36). Authentically, we stand before, as it were, the revealing of the world and
the ontological framework that structures its revealing, which grants us the ontic possibility of
reflectively interacting with both being and the structures that determine our understanding of
being. Heidegger’s worry is that the Gestell, which is deeply embedded into the history of being,
is increasingly being assumed unreflectively in the modern era, and this results in the concealing
of our authentic nature and the subordination of our reflective autonomy to the self-direction of
the Gestell.
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